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from 1999 through April 2006.  In addition to leading the seven-member Business 
Committee, he was instrumental in designing and directing a progressive agenda of 
social, economic and governance development for the tribal government and 
community.  Under his leadership, the Tribe has entered into successful business 
ventures with the goal of securing critical government revenues well into the future.  
The Tribe also enhanced its governance capabilities, instituted public services for 
tribal citizens and solidified intergovernmental relations at the local, state and national 
levels under his leadership.  Marquez is a nationally-recognized speaker and lecturer 
on such issues as economic development, tribal governance and tribal sovereignty. He 
is also the co-founder and currently the director, as well as an instructor, in the Tribal 
Administration Certificate Program housed at Claremont Graduate University. The 
title of his two courses are “Introduction to Native American History, Constitutions, 
& Law” and “Special Topics in Native American History, Constitutions, & Law.” He 
earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Arizona, a Masters degree in 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article will discuss, in four parts, a current phenomenon 
occurring within Indian communities today. First, is the path and 
process towards citizenship1 in Indian Country, and the uniqueness that 
American Indians find themselves within the meaning of a citizen. 
Second, is the federal government’s position on tribal governance and 
enrollment, which has provided tribes the ability to engage in 
disenrollment practices. In addition, the second part of this Article will 
discuss the issues these disenrollment practices present to American 
Indian communities. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez answered an 
enrollment question, but courts and tribal governments also apply 
Martinez to termination practices.2 Third, is the introduction of various 
tribal citizen disenrollment court cases which illustrate disenrollment 
practices. With such practices, these actions are the most recent 
traumatic events that Indian Country and American Indian individuals 
encounter. The final section will explore traumatic studies from Indian 
Country. These studies emphasize the already delicate environment 
tribal individuals occupy. Federal and state forces have consistently 
subjected Indian Country to ill treatment, and when the hollowing of an 
individual’s identity, spirit and soul manifests from within that 
                                                          
1.  In Indian Country, “membership” is the most operative term. See Allison M. 
Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal 
Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 79 (1993). 
The Bureau of Indian Affairs states:  
As a general rule, an American Indian or Alaska Native person is someone 
who has blood degree from and is recognized as such by a federally 
recognized tribe or village (as an enrolled tribal member) and/or the United 
States.  Of course, blood quantum (the degree of American Indian or Alaska 
Native blood from a federally recognized tribe or village that a person 
possesses) is not the only means by which a person is considered to be an 
American Indian or Alaska Native.  Other factors, such as a person’s 
knowledge of his or her tribe’s culture, history, language, religion, familial 
kinships, and how strongly a person identifies himself or herself as 
American Indian or Alaska Native, are also important.  In fact, there is no 
single federal or tribal criterion or standard that establishes a person’s 
identity as American Indian or Alaska Native. 
Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T. INTERIOR, http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last 
accessed Apr. 18, 2017).  
2.  See generally Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  
2
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individual’s community, such internal actions produce negative 
episodes.  
Disenrollment—a systematic removal and termination of an 
individual’s status as a tribal citizen of their Indian Nation—has taken 
root in tribal communities throughout Indian Country.3 The ideals and 
concepts of alienable rights4 and the natural rights5 of the individual, 
clash around disenrollment. Inalienable rights are protected as 
constitutional rights, and they extend to all citizens.6 However, in 
Indian Country, these inalienable rights morph into alienable. By the 
end of the century, tribes would engage in the disenrollment process.7 
Not dismissing the direct effects, these actions have indirect effects as 
well. Tribal governmental actions receive supreme standing; especially 
when it’s an Indian-on-Indian action that clearly falls within the sphere 
of tribal sovereignty. In such instances, tribal governments stand above 
the individual Indian; this is prevalent today, as illustrated by American 
Indian tribal governments’ self-termination acts of disenrollment.8 In 
the past, federal courts have hesitated to intervene in such internal 
affairs.9 Dr. David Wilkins, who has composed many articles on 
disenrollment, expressed deep concern of possible federal government 
intervention. He stated, “Without action to help to forestall 
                                                          
3.  Brooke Jarvis, The Disenrolled, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Jan. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/magazine/who-decides-who-counts-as-native-
american.html.   
4.  Laws that can be restricted or withheld. Cf. Stuart M. Brown, Jr., Inalienable 
Rights, 64 PHIL. REV. 192, 192-99 (1955).  
5.  Rights such as “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” prescribed in the 
United States Declaration of Independence. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See generally Brown, supra note 4.  
6.  See David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional 
Rights as Citizens, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 371-72 (2003).  
7.  Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal 
Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 385-86 
(2015).  
8.  See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); see also 
United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 603-04 (1916).  
9.  See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55-56; see also Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685-
686 (1990) (where the Supreme Court noted tribal sovereignty is especially important 
because it allows tribes “to control their own internal relations, and to preserve their 
own unique customs and social order.”).  
3
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[disenrollment], the U.S. Congress or, more realistically, the Supreme 
Court, will impose their radical treatments.”10  
I.  CITIZENSHIP 
One of the basic characteristics of citizenship is participating in a 
collective—perhaps one of the deepest of all human needs. In the 
beginning, Indian Country,11 through treaties and statutes, received 
citizenship status, and presumably the rights forged in the United States 
Constitution (including those rights found in the Bill of Rights, which 
joined the founding document in 179112). But as time has illustrated, an 
Indian’s individual rights of United States citizenship have not risen to 
the same level as others, nor have they become sacrosanct.13 John 
Adams stated in Novanglus Essays (No. 7), the United States is “[a] 
government of laws, and not of men.”14 The Articles of Confederation 
attempted to mold a gentlemen’s agreement amongst the states that 
honored each state’s legalities of the individual as equal.15 However, 
the Article’s fourth passage, as pointed out by James Madison’s 
                                                          
10.  David Wilkins, Re-Membering Through Adoption, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, (Apr. 4, 2015), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/opinions/re-
membering-through-adoption/. 
11.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1948). The term “Indian Country” is a legal term 
riddled throughout federal law and is defined here simply as all lands, including 
allotment lands, within the limits of any Indian reservation falling under the 
jurisdiction of the United States. See also DeCoteau v. Dist. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 427 
n.2 (1975). While there is a more expansive definition, this Article only requires this 
simplified version. 
12.  See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51(1833) (The United 
States Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Marshall, concluded that the first ten 
amendments (the Bill of Rights) applied only to the federal government, thus 
empowering state constitutions and forcing individuals to seek relief from state 
courts.).  
13.  Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 275 F. Supp.2d 279, 286 (2003), aff’d, 366 F.3d 
89, cert. denied 544 U.S. 974 (2005) (“Members of federally recognized Indian tribes 
are citizens of the United States and are therefore afforded constitutional protection 
against violations of individual rights by federal and state institutions, but 
constitutional provisions limiting federal or state authority are of no force in 
constraining actions of tribal governments.”).  
14.  Novanglus Essays (1775), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 205 
(2015).   
15.  See Articles of Confederation, 1 Stat. 4 (1778).  
4
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Federalist No. 42, includes multiple terms attempting to define 
citizenship.16  As the new constitution sought to provide congressional 
authority to make uniform national laws, Article 1, Section 8 granted 
Congress power regarding the “Rule of Naturalization.”17 The authority 
was to generate a uniform law to become a citizen, thus qualifying for 
the rights, responsibilities, and privileges provided by the Constitution.  
The ideals of citizenship foretell a simplistic occurrence. However, 
counter to Madison, man served as the gatekeeper to citizenship.18 Most 
evident of such denial was in a court of law. For American Indians, the 
term “subject” was deemed most appropriate.19 In 1856, Attorney 
General Caleb Cushing opined a theory demarcating American Indians 
as subjects. Cushing theorized: “The fact, therefore, that Indians are 
born in the country does not make them citizens of the United States. 
The simple truth is plain, that the Indians are the subjects of the United 
States, and therefore are not, in mere right of home-birth, citizens of the 
United States.”20  
In 1868, the 14th Amendment reaffirmed federal jurisdiction over 
“[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States . . .” and labeled 
them “citizens of the United States.”21 These constitutional alterations 
were crafted as a result of the Emancipation Proclamation.22 Simply 
stated, while the 1868 constitutional amendment guaranteed 
citizenship, it was the citizens themselves who made the full weight of 
citizenship applicable. However, Congress did not forfeit its 
constitutional rulemaking right; the constitutional amendment meant 
Congress could not legislate denial of citizenship.23 Congress enacted 
                                                          
16.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 42 (James Madison).   
17.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
18.  Contra THE FEDERALIST, supra note 16. 
19.  See generally ANDRES RESENDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY: THE UNCOVERED 
STORY OF INDIAN ENSLAVEMENT IN AMERICA (2016).  
20.  Caleb Cushing, Relation of Indians to Citizenship, in 7 OFFICIAL OPINIONS 
OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 746, 749 (C.C. Andrews ed., 
1856).   
21.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
22.  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 73 (1872) (“That [the 14th 
amendment’s] main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of 
no doubt.”).   
23. Cf. Birthright Citizenship Act of 2015, H.R. 140, 114th Cong. (2015) 
(illustrating Congress has control of addressing citizenship). 
5
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the 1866 Civil Rights Act, which stated “all persons born in the United 
States, and not subject to any foreign power” were deemed citizens, 
“excluding Indians not taxed.”24  Regarding Indians, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee concluded in 1870 that Indians did not qualify as 
citizens under the amendment.25 
Equal standing of law and citizenship could be seen as a sacred 
phenomenon, but the lack of application of the law by fellow man 
created a sacred hollowness. When the question of citizenship found its 
way to the high court, the Supreme Court arrived at a majority in the 
cases of Dred Scott v. Sandford,26 Elk v. Wilkins,27 and United States v. 
Wong Kim Ark.28  In United States v. Wong Kim Ark, the Court decided 
a question regarding the intersection of place of birth and citizenship. 
In Wong, the Supreme Court broadly interpreted the 14th Amendment 
to include birthright citizenship status to people born within the United 
States territory, rendering the United States’ parental citizenship status 
unnecessary.29 In other words, an individual need not be a citizen to 
give birth to a citizen, provided the child is born on United States soil.30 
Wong and the 14th Amendment sought to remedy discrimination that 
freed slaves and Asian immigrants encountered based on their ethnicity. 
It was viewed that the 14th amendment remedied Dred Scott,31 a case 
asking whether Mr. Scott was a free-man or slave. Conversely, Elk v. 
Wilkins was not remedied by the 14th Amendment. Elk was a case 
regarding Indian births on United States soil. The Supreme Court ruled 
birthright citizenship did not apply, and reiterated American Indian 
status as “subjects,” the same way Attorney General Cushing opined in 
1856.32 
                                                          
24.  Civil Rights Act (Enforcement Act) of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).  
25. VINE DELORIA JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, & 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 142 (2005); see also S. REP. NO. 41-268 (1868).  
26.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
27.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).  
28.  United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (Chinese immigrants 
were denied citizenship by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and proponents of 
exclusion preferred citizenship to be based on “jus sanguinis” (parent’s nationality)). 
29.  Id. at 693. 
30.  Id.  
31.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
32.  Elk, 112 U.S. at 109; see also Caleb Cushing, supra note 20, at 749. 
6
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The 14th Amendment states, “all persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States.”33  It was liberally interpreted in Wong, despite the 
government’s argument that Wong Kim Ark was a subject to the 
emperor of China.34  Sixteen years after the adoption of the 14th 
Amendment, the Supreme Court adjudicated Elk.  In its 1884 decision, 
the Court held that tribal births did not qualify for inclusion in the 
United States, deeming Indian Country beyond the jurisdiction of the 
federal government.35 Interestingly, two years later in United States v. 
Kagama, the Supreme Court changed its position by unanimously 
ruling (9-0) in favor of a federal criminal statute extending into Indian 
Country and stated that such a right was bestowed upon Congress by 
the Constitution.36 Congress further extended its plenary power by 
passing the General Allotment Act the following year.37 During the 
                                                          
33.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
34.  U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898). 
35.  Elk, 112 U.S. 94 at 102 (“Indians born within the territorial limits of the 
United States, members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian 
tribes (an alien, though dependent, power), although in a geographical sense born in 
the United States, are no more ‘born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof,’ within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than 
the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that 
government, or the children born within the United States, of ambassadors or other 
public ministers of foreign nations.”).  
36.  United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886). State courts were 
also prohibited to address crimes committed by Indians against Indians. Justice Miller 
added that state courts had been historically the American Indians “deadliest 
enemies.”  Id. 
37.  Dawes Act of 1887 (General Allotment Act), Pub. L. 49-119, 24 Stat. 388 
(1887) Act was passed on February 8, 1887 and Section 6 and Section 8 focused on 
citizenship status. Section 6 stated:  
[t]hat upon the completion of said allotments and the patenting of the lands 
to said allottees, each and every member of the respective bands or tribes of 
Indians to whom allotments have been made shall have the benefit of and 
be subjected to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in 
which they may reside; and no Territory shall pass or enforce any law 
denying any such Indians within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
law. And every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States 
to whom allotments have been made under the provisions of this act, or 
under any law or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial limits 
of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, . . . his residence separate 
and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of 
7
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wholesale dismantling of Indian Territories, Indians would receive 
allotted land after satisfying certain steps. Thereafter, they became 
recognized citizens. As pointed out by Deloria and Wilkins, the act 
contradicted Elk and further conflated the question of citizenship.38  
For Indian Country, ascription of citizenship, consensual or not, 
would not transpire until 1924 via the Indian Citizenship Act (“ICA”).39 
Regardless of the actions and steps taken by the Supreme Court and 
Congress, established citizens resisted the nature of such a title to 
American Indians, and state governments repeatedly refused to 
acknowledge their citizenship rights.40  
This regresses back to a basic question: is citizenship sacred or 
hollow? The ideals of citizenship conjure the fanciful measurements of 
status, where nationalism seeks to create community, the state provides 
the administrative mechanisms of governance, and territory provides 
                                                          
civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is 
entitled to all rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens . . . . 
Id. § 6. 
Section 8 stated:  
[t]hat provisions of this act will not extend to the territory occupied by 
[various tribes], in the Indian Territory, nor to any of the reservations of the 
Seneca Nation of New York Indians in the State of New York, nor to that 
strip of territory in the State of Nebraska adjoining the Sioux Nation on the 
south added by executive order. 
Id. § 8.  
38.  See DELORIA & WILKINS, supra note 25, at 146. Referring to the General 
Allotment Act, they stated:  
This provision, it should be noted, is in direct contradiction to both the 
Senate Judiciary Committee’s report and Elk v. Wilkins. And succeeding 
allotment acts and agreements only served to confuse the issue further. 
Finally, in 1924, Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act, which 
succinctly stated: “That all noncitizen Indians born within the territorial 
limits of the United States be, and they are hereby, declared to be citizens 
of the United States.  
Id.  
39.  Indian Citizenship Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (June 2, 1924) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)). Prior to the Indian Citizenship 
Act, two-thirds of American Indians had already been deemed citizens by treaty or 
statute. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: WITH REFERENCE 
TABLES AND INDEX 155 (1988). With the passage of the act, only 125,000 indigenous 
individuals who were born on United States territory were naturalized, excluding all 
those born across the borders in Mexico and Canada. Id.  
40.  See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.  
8
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the space. Citizenship, much like freedom, is preconditioned on 
manmade articles of governance and it is man that concedes, forms, and 
casts limitations.41 In the Elk decision, Justice Gray penned the 
following passage: 
The national legislation has tended more and more towards the 
education and civilization of the Indians, and fitting them to be 
citizens. But the question whether any Indian tribes, or any members 
thereof, have become so far advanced in civilization, that they should 
be let out of the state of pupilage, and admitted to the privileges and 
responsibilities of citizenship, is a question to be decided by the 
nation whose wards they are and whose citizens they seek to become, 
and not by each Indian for himself.42 
Justice Gray reiterates that the qualifications of becoming a citizen rest 
on the ideals of the dominant political body.43 Specifically, the nation’s 
congress has the authority and ability to extend the title of citizenship 
when it wished.44  
A piercing theme throughout the Elk opinion – that of being 
civilized – was predicated on being sufficiently intelligent and 
possessing manners and habits of civilized life.45 Accordingly, 
citizenship may become attainable by forgoing one’s tribal nature and 
manifesting a “non-tribal” state in an erstwhile fashion. Simply stated, 
American Indians needed to assimilate. Perhaps the most crucial aspect 
complicating the citizenship equation for Indian Country (i.e., the desire 
to become a United States citizen) was the difference between emigrant 
                                                          
41.  See generally Margaret R. Somers, Citizenship and the Place of the Public 
Sphere: Law, Community, and Political Culture in the Transition to Democracy, 58 
AM. SOC. REV. 587 (1993).  
42.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 106-07 (1884). 
43.  Id.  
44.  Id. at 101.  
45.  Id. at 109 (“‘The fact that [an Indian] has abandoned his nomadic life or 
tribal relations, and adopted the habits and manners of civilized people, may be a good 
reason why he should be made a citizen of the United States, but does not of itself 
make him one.’” (quoting U.S. v. Osborn, 2 F. 58, 61 (D. Or. 1880)). 
9
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race status46 and the United States Supreme Court’s term “domestic 
dependent”47 sovereign status, i.e. Indian Country.  
Justice Gray’s ruling opined that an individual Indian was Indian 
first and could not simply shed the political fabric of tribal 
governance.48 Complicating it further was the overt racism that 
persisted in this era, thereby making the citizenship equation for Indian 
Country a double negative. Race and political community seemed to 
negate allegiance. What the ICA provided was a set of rights and duties 
that are attached to federal citizenship as found in the Constitution, such 
as voting, taxation, residency and the like.49 However, the act did not 
grant complete suffrage because each state required different inclusion 
qualifying mechanisms and thus was not compatible with federal 
citizenship.50  Congressman Snyder, sponsor of the 1924 bill, stated it 
was not the intent of the bill to encroach on such qualifiers.51 States like 
Arizona and New Mexico, would not extend suffrage until 1948, 
delaying for citizens the ability to practice the citizenship rights 
recognized by ICA.52 However, as time progressed, American Indians 
were permitted to participate in and be acknowledged by federal and 
state governments.53 The same cannot be said for the individual Indian 
in Indian Country.54  
                                                          
46.  Including, for example, immigrants of the following races: Asian, African, 
Irish, Italian, English, German, etc.  
47.  Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (“The Indians are 
acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the 
lands they occupy . . . . They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic 
dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title independent of 
their will . . . . Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”). 
48.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). 
49.  See Indian Citizenship Act, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253 (Jun. 2, 1924) 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012)). 
50.  See id. 
51.  65 CONG. REC. 9303 (1924) (statement of Rep. Snyder).  
52.  FRANCIS PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 794 (1995).  
53.  Id.  
54.  “[T]he term ‘Indian country’ . . . means . . . all land within the limits of any 
Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . .” 18 
U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). 
10
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II.  DISENROLLMENT TRAILHEAD 
In 1968, Congress passed a third civil rights act, Titles I through 
VII of which are commonly known as the Indian Civil Rights Act 
(“ICRA”).55 This act arrived on the heels of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.56 The 1964 Act sought to end discriminatory practices of 
employment and public accommodations based on national origin, race, 
religion and gender in a broad sense.57 The subsequent ICRA was 
specific to Indian Country. In 1968, it included sections on tribal courts; 
civil and criminal actions; offenses on reservations, acquiring legal 
counsel; and a final section simply titled “Materials Relating to 
Constitutional Rights of Indians,” which was the gathering of past 
treaties, executive orders, laws and regulations effecting Indian 
Country.58  The most interesting section was the inclusion of a quasi-
Bill of Rights for Indians as protection from their governments.59  
The Civil War Amendments – the 13th (1865), 14th (1868) and 15th 
(1870) Amendments – were also an extension of rights unto a subset of 
people, excluding Indians.60 The 13th Amendment quashed slavery;61 
the 15th extended the right of citizens to vote.62 The 14th Amendment 
states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States. . .are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,”63 as 
upheld in Wong,64 but later denied in Elk.65 Due process was also 
included in the 14th Amendment so that no State shall “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
                                                          
55.  Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (Title I 
through Title VII codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012)).  
56.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, 88 Pub. L. 352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
57.  Id.  
58.  Civil Rights Act of 1968 §§ 101-701.  
59.  Id. § 202.  
60.  U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.  
61.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
62.  U.S. CONST. amend X. 
63.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
64.  U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).  
65.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884).  
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laws.”66  The 5th Amendment, as part of the Bill of Rights, also carries 
due process language (“nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law”) and was focused on the procedural 
functionality of judicial happenings.67  Similarly, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 includes a section stating: “No Indian tribe in 
exercising powers of self-government shall . . . (8) deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or deprive any 
person of liberty or property without due process of the law.”68  
The 1978 Supreme Court decision in Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez was a sacred watershed moment for Indian Country.69 The 
Supreme Court, by a 7-1 ruling, upheld the right of a tribal government 
over an individual.70 The 1968 ICRA initially aimed habeas corpus71 at 
criminal acts, but lower courts applied the Act to civil aspects, injecting 
federal courts with power over self-government practices, such as 
elections, voting, holding office and the like, in Indian Country.72 In 
Santa Clara, Mrs. Julia Martinez, a full-blood member of the Santa 
Clara Pueblo tribe, sought to enroll her daughter, whose father was 
Navajo, into Santa Clara Pueblo.73 In 1939, the Santa Clara Pueblo 
tribal government had passed a “membership ordinance” only 
permitting males who have children outside the Pueblo to enroll their 
children.74 Mrs. Martinez believed this was a violation of the equal 
protection clause of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, as well as the 14th 
Amendment.75 Santa Clara was not simply a question of tribal 
                                                          
66.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
67.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
68.  Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (1968) 
(Title I through Title VII codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1304 (2012)). 
Due process has morphed into two categories, substantive and procedural. Procedural 
aims towards fairness of the unfolding events. Substantive seeks to protect 
fundamental rights as prescribed in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, which are 
the sacredness of citizenship. 
69.  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
70.  Id. at 71-72.   
71.  Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (4th ed. 1968) (explaining 
that Habeas Corpus is a writ requiring a person to be brought before a judge or a 
court). 
72.  25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012)); see also PRUCHA, supra note 52, at 364.  
73.  Martinez, 436 U.S. at 49-52. 
74.  Id at 52 n.2. 
75.  Id. at 51. 
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citizenship; it was also a matter of the Constitution’s application as it 
pertains to civil rights under the due process clauses.76 The Court relied 
on Talton v. Mayes to justify its ruling that the Constitution did not 
apply.77 In Talton, the Court stated the 5th Amendment did not apply, 
because “tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by 
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on 
federal and state authority.”78 Santa Clara held that the ICRA did not 
waive any of the tribal government’s rights to suit, for such a waiver 
cannot be implied against the tribe or its officers.79 The Supreme Court 
acknowledged that the ICRA sought to serve two masters, the 
individual Indian and the tribal government.80 These are both axioms 
that the Court used to bolster its opinion:  
Creation of a federal cause of action for the enforcement of rights 
created in Title I [of the ICRA], however useful it might be in 
securing compliance with §1302, plainly would be at odds with the 
congressional goal of protecting tribal self-government. Not only 
would it undermine the authority of tribal forums . . . but it would 
also impose serious financial burdens on already “financially 
disadvantaged” tribes . . . . 
    Moreover, contrary to the reasoning of the court below, 
implication of a federal remedy in addition to habeas corpus is not 
plainly required to give effect to Congress’ objective of extending 
constitutional norms to tribal self-government. Tribal forums are 
available to vindicate rights created by the ICRA, and § 1302 has the 
substantial and intended effect of changing the law which these 
forums are obliged to apply. Tribal courts have repeatedly been 
recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of 
disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both 
Indians and non-Indians. Nonjudicial tribal institutions have also 
been recognized as competent law-applying bodies. Under these 
                                                          
76.  Id. at 56. 
77.  Id. at 56 (citing Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896)) (Ruling by an 7-1 
majority that the 5th Amendment was restricted to federal powers only. Stemming 
from a homicide conviction, the Supreme Court held that the 5th Amendment did not 
apply to legislation of the Cherokee Nation, which created a grand jury of 5 peers.). 
78.  Id.  
79.  Id. at 58-59. 
80.  Id. at 62 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)) (“Congress 
also intended to promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-
government.’”). 
13
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circumstances, we are reluctant to disturb the balance between the 
dual statutory objectives which Congress apparently struck in 
providing only for habeas corpus relief.81  
The Court did reiterate that Congress, holding firm to its plenary power, 
could tilt the scale regarding civil matters.82  
Because Mrs. Martinez was  seeking a remedy in court, regardless 
of venue (federal or tribal), the tribal government would have to waive 
its sovereign immunity to be held liable.83 As a United States citizen, 
Mrs. Martinez was afforded due process of the federal system, up to the 
highest court in the land.84 However, Mrs. Martinez would be the only 
American Indian afforded the privilege of having an enrollment 
question answered by the Supreme Court.85 Mrs. Martinez was 
informed that federal actions seeking to protect individual citizens did 
not extend to her because she was more than just a citizen.86 Mrs. 
Martinez, as well as all Indians, became a dual quasi-citizen, partially 
impregnated by two sovereigns, tribal and federal.87 Equal citizenship, 
                                                          
81.   Id. at 64-66 (citations omitted).  
82.  Id. at 60.  
83.  See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. 93-
638, § 110, 88 Stat. 2203, 2213; see also Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and 
Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 137, 155 (2004).  
84.  NELL JESSUP NEWTON, RECOGNIZING AND ENFORCING STATE AND TRIBAL 
JUDGMENTS: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION OF LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE 248 
(1993). 
85.  See Aguayo v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. 
Ct. 832 (2017); Alto v. Jewell, 661 F. App’x 502 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, Alto v. 
Haugrud, 85 U.S.L.W. 3409 (2017).  
86.  See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62-63 (“Two distinct and competing purposes are 
manifest in the provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening 
the position of individual tribal members vis-a-vis the tribe, Congress also intended 
to promote the well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’ 
This commitment to the goal of tribal self-determination is demonstrated by the 
provisions of Title I itself. Section 1302, rather than providing in wholesale fashion 
for the extension of constitutional requirements to tribal governments, as had been 
initially proposed, selectively incorporated and in some instances modified the 
safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs 
of tribal governments. Thus, for example, the statute does not prohibit the 
establishment of religion, nor does it require jury trials in civil cases, or appointment 
of counsel for indigents in criminal cases[.]”) (citations omitted).  
87.  See id. and accompanying text.  
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as Professor Jeff Spinner notes, means being able to participate fully 
regardless of race, gender or racial group “membership.”88 If equal 
citizenship means being able to participate fully, American Indians are 
still waiting to become full citizens. 
Today, various tribal tribunals, tribal enrollment committees, and 
the like address questions of enrollment.89 Santa Clara upheld the right 
of a tribe government to decide who would be permitted for enrollment 
and once enrolled, who would participate as a citizen of that 
community.90 Tribal people are familiar with pre-qualifications for 
enrollment.91 However, what happens when such qualifications are 
changed after enrollment, sometimes years later? What is the remedy?  
Justice Byron White, in his lone dissent in Santa Clara, opened with 
the following: 
The declared purpose of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA 
or Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341, is “to insure that the American 
Indian is afforded the broad constitutional rights secured to other 
Americans.” . . . The Court today, by denying a federal forum to 
Indians who allege that their rights under the ICRA have been denied 
by their tribes, substantially undermines the goal of the ICRA and in 
particular frustrates Title I’s purpose of “[protecting] individual 
Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.” 
Because I believe that implicit within Title I’s declaration of 
constitutional rights is the authorization for an individual Indian to 
                                                          
88.  JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE, ETHNICITY AND 
NATIONALITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 39 (1995).   
89. Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/tribes/enrollment (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (“The tribes 
establish membership criteria based on shared customs, traditions, language and tribal 
blood.”). 
90.  See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 49; see also id. at 72 (White, J., dissenting) 
(“Congress’ authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of 
courts in adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members 
correspondingly restrained. . .[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to 
permit the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions 
in a federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that § 1302 does not 
impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe 
or its officers.”).  
91.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 78 (informing the public that 
“Tribal enrollment criteria are set forth in tribal constitutions, articles of incorporation 
or ordinances.”). 
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bring a civil action in federal court against tribal officials for 
declaratory and injunctive relief to enforce those provisions. I 
dissent.92 
The ICRA did not provide a path for individual Indians to seek due 
process;93 so, where do individual Indians find due process? 
Disenrollment has captured many in this quagmire.94  Some derive from 
non-”financially disadvantaged” tribes.95 Further, denial of enrollment 
and the act of disenrollment are not the same. Citizenship confirms 
rights, duties and entitlements that were legitimized on the basis of 
inclusiveness and, as Professor Yasemin Soysal points out, citizenship 
“defines bounded populations, with a specific set of rights and duties, 
excluding others on the grounds of nationality.”96 Tribal governments 
have included citizens before excluding a subset of citizens. 
For any individual to become a diminished citizen, they must be 
afforded a form of due process, which typically includes a courtroom.97  
                                                          
92.  Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 at 72-73 (White, J., dissenting).  
93.  Id. at 72 (“[U]nless and until Congress makes clear its intention to permit 
the additional intrusion on tribal sovereignty that adjudication of such actions in a 
federal forum would represent, we are constrained to find that § 1302 does not 
impliedly authorize actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against either the tribe 
or its officers.”).  
94.  Elizabeth Larson, Indian Disenrollments a Statewide, Nationwide Issue, 
LAKE CTY. NEWS (Dec. 5, 2008, 4:21 PM), 
http://www.lakeconews.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=656
7:-indian-disenrollments-a-statewide-nationwide-issue&catid=1:latest&Itemid=197 
(“Late last month, the Robinson Rancheria Band of Pomos Citizens Business Council 
informed several dozen members of its intent to remove their tribal membership, an 
action taking place not just locally but around California and the nation.”).  
95.  Marc Cooper, Tribal Flush: Pechanga People “Disenrolled” en Masse, LA 
WEEKLY, (Jan. 2, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/tribal-flush-
pechanga-people-disenrolled-en-masse-2151380 (“Gomez . . . helped birth the 
Pechanga [Tribe’s] mega-resort, which opened in 2002 and today grosses as much as 
$1 billion a year . . . . But it’s Gomez’s tribe no more . . . .  Gomez and 135 adult 
members of his extended family (and 75 or more children) have been purged from 
formal Pechanga membership . . . . All of the adults, including Gomez, lost the 
generous per capita monthly payout, derived from casino profits, that was given to 
each adult of the tribe.”).  
96.  YASEMIN NUHOGLU SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANTS AND 
POSTNATIONAL MEMBERSHIP IN EUROPE 2 (1995).   
97.  Magna Carta: Muse and Mentor, Due Process of Law, LIBRARY OF CONG.: 
EXHIBITIONS, https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and-mentor/due-
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And within that process, the full magnitude of the Constitution and the 
Bill of Rights play a role; all rights pertaining to due process are 
included, because they are full citizens.98  The same is not true in Indian 
Country.99  Justice White continued in his dissent by stating that  
federal district courts have jurisdiction over ‘any civil action 
authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . [t]o recover 
damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of 
Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the 
right to vote.’ Because the ICRA is unquestionably a federal Act 
‘providing for the protection of civil rights,’ the necessary inquiry is 
whether the Act authorizes the commencement of a civil action for 
such relief, which he answered in the affirmative.100   
III.  DISENROLLMENT 
Perhaps it is only a matter of time when Indian Country becomes 
engaged in a case before the high court or hearings in Congress that 
address the difference between rights, entitlements, duties and property 
                                                          
process-of-law.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (“Due process of law is a 
constitutional guarantee that prevents governments from impacting citizens in an 
abusive way.  In its modern form, due process includes both procedural standards that 
courts must uphold in order to protect peoples’ personal liberty and a range of liberty 
interests that statutes and regulations must not infringe. . . .  The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution, which guarantee that no person shall ‘be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ incorporated the model of the 
rule of law that English and American lawyers associated most closely with Magna 
Carta for centuries.”).   
98.  Id.  
99.  See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62–63 (1978) (“Section 
1302, rather than providing in wholesale fashion for the extension of constitutional 
requirements to tribal governments, as had been initially proposed, selectively 
incorporated and in some instances modified the safeguards of the Bill of Rights to fit 
the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of tribal government . . . . Thus, for 
example, the statute does not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor does it require 
jury trials in civil cases, or appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal 
cases. . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) (2012) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of 
self-government shall. . . (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process 
of law[.]”). 
100.  Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 at 74 (White, J., dissenting) (“[A] private cause of 
action under Title I of the ICRA should be inferred.”).   
17
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that were harmoniously enjoyed for years before terminating and 
removing an Indian’s identity. Disenrollment, a recent phenomenon, 
has been practiced by approximately 80 federally recognized tribes.101  
The Supreme Court’s Santa Clara ruling has sanctioned these actions 
but why these acts are unfolding is still not truly understood.102 Gabriel 
Galanda speculates that gaming per capita—disbursement of funds that 
are generated by gaming operations—could be a reason.103 Simply 
stated, the smaller the number of tribal citizens, the larger the dividend 
for each remaining tribal citizen. This may very well be the reasoning 
for some tribal government’s disenrollment acts. In a forthcoming 
publication, “Dismembered: Banishment, Disenrollment & 
Statelessness in Indian Country,” Dr. Wilkins produces categorical 
findings on disenrollment, banishment, gaming and per capita 
payments.104 In California, 23 tribes are engaged in disenrollment and 
2 in banishment.105 Of the 25 California tribes, 20 operate gaming 
facilities of which 17 disburse per capita checks. Nationally, excluding 
California, 47 tribes are engaged in disenrollment.106 Of this cohort, 34 
operate gaming facilities.107 Of the 47, 2 tribes are engaged in both 
banishment and disenrollment; 16 distribute checks, while 28 do not, 
and 3 are not known.108 In the aggregate, 34.72% (just over one-third) 
of disenrollment actions are transpiring in California; Oklahoma is 
second with 9.72%.109 Given the high occurrences in California, there 
                                                          
101.  See Galanda & Dreveskracht, supra note 7, at 408-09. 
102.  See generally id. at 410 (“Ironically, disenrollment is antithetical to tribal 
self-determination and self-sufficiency via economic development. In most instances, 
tribal disenrollment serves only to harm a tribe’s bottom line by creating negative 
media and investor perceptions that indicate greed and corruption. Potential business 
partners may also conclude that working with a tribal government engaged in 
deserting its own citizens is not worth the risk to investment.”). 
103.  Gabriel Galanda, The Reluctant Watchdog: How National Indian Gaming 
Commission Inaction Helps Tribes Disenroll Members for Profit, and Jeopardizes 
Indian Gaming as We Know It, 20 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 147, 148 (2016) 
(“Disenrollment tied to gaming per capita payments is now epidemic.”). 
104.  DAVID WILKINS, DISMEMBERED: BANISHMENT, DISENROLLMENT & 
STATELESSNESS IN INDIAN COUNTRY (forthcoming 2017). 
105.  Id.  
106.  Id.  
107.  Id. 
108.  Id. 
109.  Id. 
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are two cases that exemplify disenrollment acts by tribal governments: 
Jeffredo v. Macarro and San Diego Health and Human Service Agency 
v. Michelle T.110 Both include tribal governments that engage in gaming 
operations and both engage in per capita programs. Both are located in 
Southern California.  
A.  Jeffredo v. Macarro 
Since 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has entertained five 
cases dealing with disenrollment.111 In all cases, the tribal governments 
and officers were immune from suit and the question of enrollment was 
answered in Santa Clara.112 In Jeffredo v. Macarro, Judge N.R. Smith 
wrote: 
The Pechanga Band of the Luiseño Mission Indians (“Pechanga 
Tribe”) disenrolled a number of its members (“Appellants”) for 
failing to prove their lineal descent as members of the Tribe. Federal 
courts generally lack jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the 
decision of an Indian tribe to disenroll one of its members. 
Appellants, therefore, brought this petition for habeas corpus under 
25 U.S.C. § 1303 of the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), claiming 
their disenrollment by members of the Pechanga Tribal Council 
(“Appellees”) was tantamount to an unlawful detention. Despite the 
novelty of this approach and despite the potential injustice of this 
situation, we nonetheless lack subject matter jurisdiction to consider 
this claim, because Appellants were not detained. Therefore, 
Appellants cannot bring their claims under § 1303 of the ICRA and 
we must affirm the district court. Only Congress can aid these 
appellants.113  
The Court relied upon Santa Clara, but the circumstances in 
Jeffredo differed.114 The Pechanga Band of the Luiseno Mission 
                                                          
110.  Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2010); In re K.P., 195 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).  
111.  See Jeffredo, 599 F.3d 913; Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Cahto Tribe of Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke, 715 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Aguayo v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Smith, 597 F. App’x 442 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
112.  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978). 
113.  Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 915 (emphasis added). 
114.  Compare id. at 921, with Martinez, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32.  
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Indians, a federally recognized tribe, adopted their constitution in 1978, 
which included qualifications for membership.115 As described in 
Jeffredo, to qualify, lineal descent from “original Pechanga Temecula 
people . . . [and] [p]eople who were accepted in the Indian Way prior to 
1928 will be accepted.”116 Those not accepted are “adopted people, 
family or Band, and non-Indians” as well as anyone else “enrolled or 
recognized in any other reservation.”117 The issue in Jeffredo was 
Section A of the tribe’s constitutional requirement: “Applicant must 
show proof of Lineal Descent from original Pechanga Temecula 
people” and according to the court, in late 2002, “the Enrollment 
Committee received information from its members alleging that a 
number of Pechanga Tribe members were not” original.118 Thus, the 
Enrollment Committee commenced an investigation and starting 
disenrolling individuals; 8 years later, we have Judge Smith’s opinion 
in Jeffredo.119   
Judge Wilken issued a dissenting opinion. He stated: 
Appellants, enrolled members of the Pechanga Tribe since birth, 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act (ICRA) asserting that their Tribal Council violated the 
due process, equal protection, free speech and cruel and unusual 
punishment clauses of the Act when it stripped them of membership 
in the Tribe. The membership criteria that the Tribal Council applied 
were not established until 1979; the procedures it used to disenroll 
Tribal members were not established until 1988; and the Tribal 
Council did not begin disenrolling large numbers of members until 
recently, when the Tribe’s casino profits became a major source of 
revenue. Appellants allege that they are victims of the Tribal 
Council’s greed associated with these casinos. 
The majority concluded that the district court properly dismissed 
Appellants’ petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because 
Appellants (1) were not detained and (2) did not exhaust their Tribal 
remedies. I respectfully dissent . . . .120  
                                                          
115.  Jeffredo, 599 F.3d at 915. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id.  
118.  Id. at 915-16. 
119.  Id. at 916. 
120.  Id. at 921-22 (Wilken, J., dissenting) (internal footnotes omitted).  
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Interestingly, the lone footnote in the dissent, as marked above, 
states: “At the time of Appellants’ disenrollment, every adult 
Pechangan received a per capita benefit of over $250,000 per year.”121 
Even the majority opinion shares concern with Pechanga’s 
governmental actions of self-termination practices. Judge Smith’s 
majority opinion contains a concerning phrase – “despite the potential 
injustice of this situation” – possessing strong descriptive terms.122 The 
term “injustice” should be remembered when discussing “ex post facto 
disenrollment.” Jeffredo does support Galanda’s thesis (the lack of 
oversight by the National Indian Gaming Commission helps 
disenrollment for larger profit shares for remaining members).123 
However, without his thesis and probing, along with others, the desire 
to uncover the genesis of such actions would not be discussed. Plus, the 
remaining Ninth Circuit cases – Alto v. Black, Cahto Tribe of 
Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke, and Allen v. Smith – all include 
tribal governments that operate gaming operations.124  Three of the four 
tribes engage in per capita payments from gaming operations, though 
the degree of amount differs from tribe-to-tribe.125 A more troubling 
disenrollment affect, beyond the per capita posit, is the specific 
politically secured extensions and practices of federal Indian law, 
because they are no longer Indian. The act of disenrollment surpasses 
reservation boundaries; it also removes laws that seek to protect, secure 
and foster.  
                                                          
121.  Id. at 922 n.1. 
122.  Id. at 915.  
123.  Id. 
124.  See Jeffredo, 599 F.3d 913; Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Cahto Tribe of Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke, 715 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 2013); 
Aguayo v. Jewell, 827 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2016); Allen v. Smith, 597 F. App’x 442 
(9th Cir. 2015). 
125.  See Alto, 738 F.3d at 1118; Tony Perry, Pala Tribe Roiled by Bloodline 
Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/ 
mar/17/local/la-me-pala-dispute-20120318. 
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B.  San Diego Health and Human Service Agency v. Michelle T. 
The Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) of 1978126 was crafted to 
assist in the placing of American Indian children into culturally 
favorable settings to cultivate the child’s culture. ICWA was 
Congress’s reaction to Indian children being placed into non-Indian 
homes (foster or adopted), which broke up Indian families.127 ICWA 
extended and granted “exclusive” tribal jurisdiction over disposition of 
foster care and adoption of Indian children.128 However, in San Diego 
Health and Human Service Agency v. Michelle T.,129 the intent of 
ICWA was defeated by a tribe’s ability to simply disenroll current 
members.130  
In 2009, a court placed two nine-month old twins, K.P. and 
Kristopher, in foster care at the home of Mr. and Mrs. G.131 The court 
notified their tribe, the Pala Band of Mission Indians.132  Their tribe’s 
chairman, Smith, responded that the twins were eligible for enrollment 
under the IWCA.133 In July of that year, the Pala Tribe filed for 
                                                          
126.  Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 
(1978) [hereinafter ICWA]. 
127.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 8 (1978) (“[t]he purpose of [the ICWA] is to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security 
of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum Federal standards for the 
removal of Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in 
foster or adoptive homes.”).  
128.   See ICWA § 101, 92 Stat. at 3071 (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction 
exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child 
who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such 
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law. Where an Indian 
child is a ward to a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child. (b) In any State court 
proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an 
Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, 
the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding 
to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of 
either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child’s tribe: Provided, That such 
transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.”). 
129.  In re K.P., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).  
130.  Id. at 560.  
131.  Id. at 553-54.  
132.  Id.  
133.  Id.  
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intervention.134 It submitted a plan of guardianship, which was favored 
by the court.135 The plan granted visitation rights to the mother while 
the twins remained with Mr. and Mrs. G.136 The court considered 
parental visitation rights a pathway to cultural connection.137 The 
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction in August of 2011 after 
accepting the plan of guardianship.138 For two years while the twins 
were under the care of Mr. and Mrs. G., Michelle T. was an absentee 
parent, visiting the twins periodically.139 Eventually, she began visiting 
them once a month.140 As the frequency of her visits increased, Michelle 
T. conveyed to the twins “that she was their real mother and they should 
not call Mrs. G. ‘mom.’”141 Mrs. G. reported to the court that “the 
children were ‘unsett[led]’” by the visits.142 In December 2013, the 
G.’s, seeking more control over visits, asked the San Diego County 
Health and Human Service Agency (“SDCHHSA”) to reinstate 
dependency jurisdiction.143 The Agency set a new hearing at which it 
recommended that the G.’s adopt the children. It then contacted their 
tribe to discuss the recommendation144  
The Pala Band of Mission Indians informed the Agency that as of 
February 2012, the twins were not enrolled in IWCA because they 
lacked the proper blood quantum degree.145 Pala’s Executive 
Committee (“EC”) adopted a revised enrollment ordinance in 2009, 
which allowed the EC to erase or “remove a member’s name from the 
                                                          
134.  Id.  
135.  Id. at 553-54. 
136.  Id. at 554-55. 
137.  See id. at 554.  
138.  Id. (“The Pala Band General Council rejected the Agency’s proposed 
permanent plan of tribal customary adoption and instead approved a plan of 
guardianship for the children.”). 
139.  Id. 
140.  Id.  
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id.; see also Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Congress 
intended Public Law 280 states to have jurisdiction over Indian child dependency 
proceedings unless tribes availed themselves of Section 1918 [in ICWA] in order to 
obtain exclusive jurisdiction.”). 
144.  In re K.P., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 554-55. 
145. Id. at 555-56; see also supra note 1 (defining blood quantum).  
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Pala Band’s roll on a finding that an application misstated or omitted 
facts that may have made the applicant ineligible for enrollment.”146 
Interestingly, a tribal individual can appeal to the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs’ (“BIA”) Pacific Regional Director, but the EC has final 
authority.147  
In 2011, the EC asserted that the ancestor of Michelle T., known as 
M.B., precluded the twins’ generation from meeting the requirements 
for enrollment.148 And so, the Pala Tribe terminated the twins’ rights to 
tribal benefits.149 M.B., born in 1856, was thought to have been a full-
blood (4/4) and was “identified on the Pala Band’s November 1913 
allotment roll as having 4/4 degree Pala Indian blood.”150 In 2011, 98 
years later, the EC determined M.B. was only one-half degree and 
adjusted their rolls accordingly.151  
Michelle T. appealed to the BIA.152 But, it resulted in a no decision, 
and the BIA recommended that the twins remain enrolled “with the Pala 
Band because there was no evidence to support their disenrollment.”153 
The Department of the Interior’s Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 
concurred with the BIA’s recommendation, “stating that ‘the 
Department has no authority under federal or tribal law to decide 
enrollment issues for the [Pala] Band.’”154 However, after declaratory 
relief was denied by a federal district court and during the pendency of 
the appeal to the 9th Circuit, the Department of Interior and the plaintiffs 
                                                          
146.  In re K.P., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 555.  
147.  Id. 
148.  Id.  
149.  Id. at 555-56. 
150.  Id. at 555 n.3. 
151.  Id. (“Previously, there had been inconsistent determinations as to the blood 
degree of M.B.’s descendants. Until 1984, the BIA considered M.B. as a ‘halfblood’ 
in determining the blood degree of her descendants. In resolving an appeal on one of 
M.B.’s descendants in 1989, the BIA concluded that M.B. was a ‘fullblood’ and 
‘direct[ed] that the blood degree of her descendants be reviewed and corrected 
accordingly.’”).  
152.  Id. at 556.  
153.  Id. 
154.  Id.  
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brokered an agreement not to remove the plaintiff-Indians off Pala’s 
federal rolls.155   
Michelle T. sought to stop the tribe’s disenrollment action. She 
argued, “in view of a pending appeal in the United States Court of the 
Ninth Circuit challenging the validity of the Pala Band’s enrollment 
ordinance,” the disenrollment of her two children was not yet final.156 
She continued to argue that enrollment was not a requirement to be 
considered an “Indian child.”157 The juvenile court, ignoring her 
request, moved forward and issued its ruling: 
This case involves an essence of the concept of sovereignty. There is 
no dispute that the Pala Band is a sovereign Indian nation. It is a 
separate political entity. They have their own governing 
documents. . . And, here, the tribe, not a party to the lawsuit, has 
rendered an opinion, whether we agree with it or not, that the children 
are no longer considered Indian children by virtue of [its] calculation 
of blood quantum requirements. That is both a factual determination 
and a legal interpretation of their governing documents, particularly, 
the enrollment ordinances. And under either analysis, factual or 
legal, it would be an impermissible intrusion to second guess [the 
Pala Band] to counter what they have done.158 
“The juvenile court determined that the [twins] were not Indian children 
within the meaning of ICWA” and because they were likely to be 
adopted in a reasonable amount of time by the G family, the court 
terminated Michelle T.’s parental rights.159 The California Court of 
Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s ruling.160 By Pala diminishing the 
children’s status as Indian,161 ICWA no longer protected the children162 
                                                          
155.  Id. at 555. However, the State Court noted that “[u]nder the ICWA, the 
Department of the Interior’s agreement to take no action to remove individuals from 
the federally maintained roll of the Pala Band during the federal appeal is irrelevant 
to the children’s state court dependency proceedings.” Id. at 560. 
156.  Id. at 553. 
157.  Id. 
158.  Id. at 557.  
159.  Id.  
160.  Id. at 560.  
161.  See id. at 553-54.  
162.  See id. at 557-58.  
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and as tribes continue with this practice, families who have been 
disenrolled by their tribe could face similar events. 
In March of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported a strikingly 
similar story about Margarita Owlinguish Britten, a Pala Indian Tribe 
member who died in 1925.163 Britten “was a revered elder of the Pala 
Indian Tribe, a survivor of the forced relocation in 1903 of the Cupeno 
Indians to an area beside the San Luis Rey River in northern San Diego 
County.”164 However, the EC disenrolled about 162 of her descendants, 
terminating their $7,500 per month per capita check along with health 
and education coverage.165 By reclassifying Margarita Britten as only 
half-Indian, today’s descendants do not meet the 1/16th threshold.166 As 
the L.A. Times article shows, the Pala Indian Tribe has a history of 
reducing deceased Pala ancestors’ blood quantum degrees, allowing it 
to disenroll the ancestors’ living descendants from the tribe and its 
social welfare benefits.167  
C.  Aftermath 
The late 1990’s and early 2000’s were the beginning of the end for 
high stakes bingo halls and modest card rooms. In California, those 
days witnessed the overhaul of California’s laws and constitution, 
which paved the way for the erection of non-tribal mega-casinos.168 
Between 1997 and 2012, approximately two-dozen California tribes 
                                                          
163.  Tony Perry, supra note 125.  
164.  Id.  
165.  Id. Assuming all 162 received full per capita payments, the amount 
repurposed back to the tribe would be $1,215,000 per month and $14,580,000 per 
year. Taking a conservative approach, if 54 adults receive per capita payments, 
$405,000 would be disbursed monthly and $4,860,000 annually. This amount does 
not include cost of health care, education and other tribal government programs. See 
id.  
166. Id. 
167.  Id.  
168.  See S. Res. 142, Proposed S. CONST. Amend. 11, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. 
(Cal. 1999) (providing full text of proposition); CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19. See 
generally CAL. GAMBLING CONTROL COMM’N, CALIFORNIA GAMBLING LAW, 
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disenrolled 3,000 Indians.169 The aftermath of disenrollment for tribal 
people across the nation is a traumatic experience. The loss of Indian 
legal status, loss of place, loss of identity, and for some, loss of financial 
assistance may produce trauma in their lives.  
IV.  TRAUMA 
History is traumatic.170 Effects on those experiencing 
disenrollment—the amputation of mind, body, and spirit—has an 
impact on their soul. No longer included in their society, removed by 
legal force, legal standing diminished, terminated from their intrinsic 
setting, there must be an effect. Studies of the two – trauma and 
disenrollment – are lacking, but the actions taken are not new to Indian 
Country; the only difference being the political body executing the 
actions. Jeffrey Alexander, an expert on social trauma, states that 
trauma “is not something naturally existing; it is something constructed 
by society.”171 Thus, trauma is manmade. The National Indian Child 
Welfare Association (“NICWA”) defines trauma as “an event, or series 
of events, that causes moderate to severe reactions.”172 “Traumatic 
events are characterized by a sense of horror, helplessness, serious 
injury, or the threat of serious injury or death . . . affecting those who 
suffer injuries or loss.”173 Further, trauma addressed to the specific 
conditions and experiences of indigenous people is a “‘unique 
individual experience associated with a traumatic event or enduring 
conditions . . . often related to the cultural trauma, historical trauma, 
and intergenerational trauma that has accumulated in AI/AN [American 
Indian/Alaska Native] communities through centuries of exposure to 
                                                          
169.   WILKINS, supra note 104.  
170.  Typically, and simplistically, history transpires in a binary “inferior-
superior” hegemonic multi-constant relationship. Indian Country has encountered 
such a relationship; the “superior” group seeks to control the “inferior” group. Control 
becomes the operative word. The superior group seeks to provide illusions – a 
phantom sovereign spirit – onto the inferior, with the former in ultimate sovereign 
control. Tribal government’s actions of disenrollment have similar components. See 
generally JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, TRAUMA: A SOCIAL THEORY (2012). 
171.  Id. at 7.  
172. Trauma-Informed Care Fact Sheet, NICWA (Apr. 2014),  
http://www.nicwa.org/mental_health/SystemsOfCare/documents/TraumaInformedC
areFactSheet_April2014_000.pdf [hereinafter NICWA].  
173.  Id. 
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racism, warfare, violence, and catastrophic disease.’”174 These 
referenced traumatic events are all manmade episodes.  
Maria Yellow Horse Braveheart coined the phrase “historical 
trauma” (a “cumulative emotional and psychological wounding, over 
the lifespan and across generations, emanating from massive group 
trauma”) back in the 1980s, and her theory consists of six categories:  
1. First Contact: life shock, genocide, no time for grief. 
Colonization Period: introduction of disease and alcohol, 
traumatic events such as Wounded Knee Massacre. 
2. Economic Competition: sustenance loss (physical/spiritual)  
3. Invasion/War Period: extermination, refugee symptoms. 
4. Subjugation/Reservation Period: confined/translocated, 
forced dependency on oppressor, lack of security.  
5. Boarding School Period: destroyed family system, beatings, 
rape, prohibition of Native language and religion. Lasting 
effect: ill-prepared for parenting, identity confusion.  
6. Forced Relocation and Termination Period: transfer to urban 
areas, prohibition of religious freedom, racism and being 
viewed as second class; loss of governmental system and 
community.175 
However, a new category must be proposed to capture the latest 
disenrollment actions taking place across the country and many of the 
elements listed above capture what disenrollment may produce.  
NICWA lists four forms of trauma, with current trauma being a 
concern.176 In 2007, according to the National Center for Children in 
Poverty, American Indian children are 2.5 times more likely to 
experience trauma.177According to Novins, Fickenscher and Manson, 
in a study focused on American Indian adolescents ages 13 to 18, with 
a sample size of 99 from 27 different tribes (58 males and 41 females), 
the study found a 14.6% prevalence rate of Major Depressive Disorder 
                                                          
174.  Id. 
175.  Vinnie Rotondaro, Reeling from the Impact of Historical Trauma, NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REP. (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/printpdf/108976. 
176.  NICWA, supra note 172. 
177.  Janice L. Cooper, Facts about Trauma for Policymakers: Children’s 
Mental Health, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY (July 2007), 
www.nccp.org/publications/pub_746.html. 
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among the indigenous youth, with females reporting a 25.7% rate.178 
Anxiety and depressive disorders were at 19.1% with females 
experiencing a higher rate at 28.6%.179 Conduct disorder was reported 
at 74.2% for the total cohort.180 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder was 
reported at 10.1%.181 Of the 66 reported as conduct disorder, 
tranquilizers, marijuana and alcohol were the most abused substances 
at 91.7%, 80% and 78.3% respectively by this cohort.182   
In 2001, Yu and Stiffman conducted a study using a multiple and 
interactive environmental (familial, social and cultural) predictor 
regression model on 401 American Indian adolescent youths with 
alcohol/dependence symptoms where participants engaged in 
community activities.183 Of the sample, 205 were from reservations and 
196 from urban centers, with an age range of 13 to 19.184 On average, 
reservation cohorts initiated alcohol use at 13.4 years old compared to 
14.3, for their urban peers.185 Of those who had consumed more than 
six drinks (n=209) in their life, 20.2% drink weekly, with 21.9% 
drinking at least one week a month.186 The study found that “generic 
cultural activities” (memorials, feasts, powwows, dances, giveaways 
and religious celebrations) might not have a positive influence when 
compared to “cultural pride/spirituality” activities (sweats, naming 
ceremonies, talking circles and spiritual running).187 The results of the 
study stated: 
                                                          
178.  D. Novis, A. Fickensher & S. Mason, American Indian Adolescents in 
Substance Abuse Treatment: Diagnostic Status, 30 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 
275, 279 (2006). “The goal of this study was to describe the prevalence of Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) psychiatric disorders among a 
sample of American Indians (AI) adolescents in residential substance abuse treatment. 
Data on 89 AI adolescents admitted to a tribally operated residential substance abuse 
treatment program were collected.” Id. at 275.   
179.  Id. at 280. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  ManSoo Yu & Arlene Rubin Stiffman, Culture and Environment as 
Predictors of Alcohol Abuse/Dependence Symptoms in American Indian Youths, 32 
ADDICTIVE BEHAV. 2253, 2254 (2007).   
184.  Id. 
185.  Id. at 2255.  
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. at 2256. 
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In contrast, pride in being American Indian and religious affiliation 
were associated with fewer alcohol symptoms. Importantly, religious 
affiliation reduced the impacts of negative familial and social 
environments on youth’s alcohol symptoms. This has implications 
for further intervention/prevention strategies: promoting cultural 
pride/spirituality and religious affiliation, particularly in the presence 
of problematic peers and family situations, adolescents may reduce 
alcohol involvement and, consequently, prevent problems.188  
Traumatic episodes and substance dependence seem to emerge in 
early adulthood for the American Indian population as the Ehlers study 
found in 2013.189 Eight contiguous reservations provided the 
participants, each having at least 1/16th Native American Heritage and 
ranging between 18 and 70 years old.190  A traumatic range, or baseline, 
was crafted that included seven types of possible trauma: military 
combat, sexual abuse, injury or assault, natural disaster with loss, 
witnessed trauma, crime experienced without injury, and unexpected 
death.191 This baseline was measured against specific traumas: 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), heritability of assaultive trauma, 
comorbidity of trauma and PTSD with substance dependence, affective 
disorder and conduct disorder.192 Of the 309 that completed the Semi-
Structured Assessment for the Genetics of Alcoholism (“SSAGA”), 
denoting information on traumatic events and PTSD, 94% reported 
experiencing at least 1 of the 7 types of trauma – 92% males; 94% 
females.193  Thirty-four percent of participants, exposed to at least one 
traumatic event, met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-IV) for PTSD with women receiving a higher PTSD 
score (38%) versus men (29%).194  
                                                          
188.  Id. at 2258. 
189.  Cindy L. Ehlers et al., Lifetime History of Traumatic Events in an 
American Indian Community Sample: Heritability and Relation to Substance 
Dependence, Affective Disorder, Conduct Disorder and PTSD, 47 J. PSYCHIATRIC 
RES. 155, 155 (2013). 
190.  Id. at 156. 
191.  Id. 
192.  Id.   
193.  Id. at 157. 
194.  Id. at 157-58. 
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The purpose of including these studies, of which there are many 
more stating the same, was to illustrate that Indian Country is rife with 
traumatic events, which commence early in childhood, and continue to 
have grand effects.195 Dr. Adachi discussed such concerns in an open 
letter to Indian Country regarding disenrollment and she wrote that 
disenrollment “perpetuates historical trauma,” leading to “historical 
loss,” which results in “depression, PTSD, and poly-drug use in Native 
youth.”196 The Whitbeck study in 2004 was based on 143 American 
Indian parents, of children 10 to 12 years of age in the upper 
Midwest.197 The historical loss segment (using the Historical Loss 
Scale and the Historical Loss Associated Symptoms Scale), found that 
the loss of traditional/spiritual ways (33.4%), tribal language (36.3%) 
and tribal culture (33.7%) were consciously a daily cerebral thought.198 
Only the effects of alcohol (losses associated with the effects of 
alcoholism) ranked higher (45.9%) as a daily thought.199 Regarding 
sadness or depression, 44% reported “sometimes” while 11.3% 
reported “often.200 Anger registered positively at 38.1% for 
“sometimes” and 16.9% was reported for “often.”201 Anxiety or 
nervousness was also measured and 23.1% responded “sometimes” 
with 8.1% responding to “often.”202 Thus, as Dr. Adachi’s letter 
suggests, these elements exist and disenrollment can add to the 
psychological ills that already reside within the very same communities 
that are dismembering “tribal members.”203 The addition of 
disenrollment stress – “Am I next?” – may only serve to negatively 
impact tribal people. Once ousted, where do tribal people and tribal 
families go to seek psychological traumatic help?  
                                                          
195.  Katya Adachi, Association of American Indian Physicians Background 
Paper on Disenrollment, ASS’N AM. INDIAN PHYSICIANS, 
https://www.aaip.org/media/news/m.blog/76/disenrollment-background-papers-and-
resolution (last accessed Apr. 27, 2017).  
196.  Id. 
197.  Les B. Whitbeck et al., Conceptualizing and Measuring Historical 
Trauma Among American Indian People, 33 AM. J. CMTY. PSY. 119, 120 (2004). 
198.  Id. at 124.  
199.  Id.  
200.  Id. at 125. 
201.  Id.  
202.  Id.  
203.  See Adachi, supra note 195. 
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CONCLUSION 
As discussed, citizenship for the United States of America was, and 
is, considered a privilege and a feat many aspire to achieve. Race had, 
and does, play a role. For example, early in the 19th Century, the United 
States Supreme Court issued a set of cases known as the Insular 
Cases,204 mostly denoting territories as “unincorporated” and 
“incorporated.”205 The Court contemplated the application of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights to territories newly acquired after 
conquest.206 In 1904, the Supreme Court ruled in Dorr v. United States 
that the inhabitants of the Philippines Islands would not be extended 
due process until Congress extended such rights.207  In 1903, the court 
in Hawaii v. Mankichi, ruled that until Hawaii was incorporated into the 
United States, the Bill of Rights, namely the 5th and 6th Amendments, 
would not apply to Hawaiians.208 Prior to these two cases, in 1901, in 
Downes v. Bidwell, the Supreme Court ruled that Puerto Rico was not 
“foreign” nor part of the United States as a state, a phrase familiar to 
Indian Country.209 But in 1904, the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzales v. 
Williams that citizens of Puerto Rico were not aliens, as defined by the 
Immigration Act of 1891, thus the Commissioners of Immigration 
could not detain new arrivals.210 112 years later, the Supreme Court 
denied a petition for a writ of certiorari from a D.C. Circuit case, Tuaua 
v. United States, considering whether American Samoa qualified as a 
territory that included birthplace rights – jus soli – for citizenship.211 A 
unanimous appellate court ruled that citizenship did not extend to 
                                                          
204.  See generally De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United 
States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong 
v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus 
v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).  
205.  James E. Kerr also includes political motivations were also prevalent 
during this time, given the election of 1900 and America’s overwhelming support of 
territory acquisition. See generally JAMES E. KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE 
OF THE JUDICIARY IN AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM (Rudolph J. Gerber ed., 1982).  
206.  See generally Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904).  
207.  Id. at 143. 
208.  Hawaii v. Mankicki, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903). 
209.  Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 248-49 (1901).  
210.  Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 12 (1904). 
211.  Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016) (denying petition for writ 
of certiorari). 
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individuals born in American Samoa.212 The court reaffirmed that 
Congress has to extend such statutes as it has with other territories.213 
In her ruling, Justice Janice Roger Brown wrote: 
Citizenship is not the sum of its benefits. It is no less than the 
adoption or ascription of an identity, that of “citizen” to a particular 
sovereign state, and a ratification of those mores necessary and 
intrinsic to association as a full functioning component of that 
sovereignty. At base Appellants ask that we forcibly impose a 
compact of citizenship—with its concomitant rights, obligations, and 
implications for cultural identity—on a distinct and unincorporated 
territory of people, in the absence of evidence that a majority of the 
territory’s inhabitants endorse such a tie and where the territory’s 
democratically elected representatives actively oppose such a 
compact. 
    We can envision little that is more anomalous, under modern 
standards, than the forcible imposition of citizenship against the 
majoritarian will.214 
Within that ruling, Elk appears to be setting the bar of separation 
regarding the Citizenship Clause.215 Focusing on jurisdiction in 
relationship to the United States, the court’s opinion in Elk states that 
whole political jurisdiction was needed to receive citizenship status, not 
partial.216 Dependence on the United States government must be full 
and not semi-independent, a position the American Samoan 
Government agreed with.217  
                                                          
212.  Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 311-12 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
213.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . 
establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization;”); see also id. at amend. XIV (“All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”). The American 
Samoan Government also opposed automatic citizenship, believing such a 
jurisdictional extension by the United States would interfere with their governmental 
practices. David G. Savage, American Samoans demand Supreme Court finally grant 
them full citizenship, L.A. TIMES (June 9, 2016, 2:20 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-fg-court-samoan-citizens-20160609-snap-
story.html. 
214.  Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 311. 
215.  Id. at 305-306. 
216.  Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884).  
217.  See Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 310-11. 
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In a separate amicus curiae brief, congressional members and 
former government officials filed a supportive brief for the petitioner. 
The brief to the Supreme Court stated:  
As current and former government officials of the U.S. Territories, 
Amici are uniquely well positioned to speak to the profound 
implications of that profoundly wrong decision. If birthright 
citizenship really is something that persons born in the Territories 
enjoy only as a matter of legislative grace, then there is nothing to 
stop Congress from denying citizenship to persons born in Puerto 
Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or the Northern Mariana Islands 
tomorrow. Indeed, it is not even clear that Congress could not revoke 
birthright citizenship of territorial residents who currently enjoy it. 
The decision below thus imperils the citizenship of everyone born in 
the U.S. Territories.  
    That result cannot be reconciled with the text, structure, history, 
and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Unsurprisingly, the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision is grounded in none of those things, but instead 
rests largely on the notion that the American Samoa Government 
should get to dictate whether American Samoans enjoy constitutional 
birthright citizenship. Setting aside the rather obvious problem with 
conditioning a constitutional right on the will of the majority, the 
concerns that led the D.C. Circuit to defer to the preferences of the 
American Samoa Government are completely unfounded, as 
recognizing that the Citizenship Clause applies with full force to the 
Territories would not imperil the culture or the people of American 
Samoa citizenship. Setting aside the rather obvious problem with 
conditioning a constitutional right on the will of the majority, the 
concerns that led the D.C. Circuit to defer to the preferences of the 
American Samoa Government are completely unfounded, as 
recognizing that the Citizenship Clause applies with full force to the 
Territories would not imperil the culture or the people of American 
Samoa.218  
The amicus brief illustrates the important role Congress plays in 
deciding territorial—incorporated and unincorporated—status of 
citizenship.  The current and former officials ask a profound question: 
Why does the American Samoa Government get to dictate whether 
                                                          
218.  Brief for Amici Curiae Members of Congress and Former Governmental 
Officials in Support of Petitioners at 3-4, Tuaua v. United States 136 S. Ct. 2461 
(2016) (No. 15-981), 2016 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 984, at *5-*7.  
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American Samoans enjoy constitutional birthright citizenship? Perhaps 
the answer is found in Santa Clara v. Martinez, the very same canon 
crippling American Indians today. Without citizenship there are no 
constitutional protections, no due process, and no equal standing, a 
phenomenon being witnessed within tribal citizen disenrollment 
practices. Congress has power to extend the criteria of citizenship and 
the same lawmakers—as history dictates—under the doctrine of 
plenary power, can issue the same constitutional rights to those seeking 
a voice regarding removal and termination from their tribal 
communities that courts currently deny.  
Lastly, tribal government’s disenrollment practices are traumatic 
events. Manmade termination and removal of tribal citizens have a high 
probability of imperilment.219 Tribal communities already host many 
afflictions, which are well documented. There are no current studies 
taking place that seek to correlate disenrollment and the traumatic 
categories, but traumatic episodes are present in Indian communities 
across the country. Indian Country simply cannot afford to lose any 
more American Indians, including those disenrolled.  
According to the Suicide Prevention Resource Center (“SRPC”), 
utilizing data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
American Indians/Alaska Natives have a suicide rate of 16.93 per 
100,000, while the total population rate is 12.08 per 100,000, with the 
10-24 age range being the highest cohort for American Indians/Alaska 
Natives.220 Amongst the youth, as SRPC illustrates in the table below, 
underage drinking becomes a coping mechanism.  
 
  
                                                          
219.  Id. at 4 (“Recognizing that the Citizenship Clause applies with full force 
to the Territories would not imperil the culture or the people of American Samoa.”).  
220.  SUICIDE PREVENTION RESOURCE CTR., SUICIDE AMONG RACIAL/ETHNIC 
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Results of 2013 Youth Risk Behavior Survey of High School 
Students Regarding Drinking Status and Depression, Suicide 
Consideration, and Developing a Suicide Plan221 
 




34% 17% 20% 
Current, 
No Binge 
23% 16% 15% 
Current, 
Binge 
30% 15% 16% 
 
Traumatic events that trigger depressive episodes were once an external 
matter, but with internal traumatic manifestations, these episodes may 
have a deeper and greater psycho-social impact, one that has yet to be 
measured.  
Studies have been conducted that consider trauma within Indian 
communities. In one study, looking at rates of violence and trauma in a 
Southwestern Indian community, 81.4% (N=247) experienced some 
form of trauma and of individuals who experienced multiple traumatic 
events, 66% (N=163), had a higher risk rate of developing 
depression.222 Such traumatic events, such as combat, physical assault, 
witnessing extreme violence, serious injury, fire or unexpected 
deaths—to name a few—may have long-lasting impressions, such as 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, within families and across 
generations.223 These events may lead to unresolved grief and 
                                                          
221.  SUICIDE PREVENTION RESOURCE CTR., SUICIDE AMONG RACIAL/ETHNIC 
POPULATIONS IN THE U.S.: AMERICAN INDIANS/ALASKA NATIVES 3 (2013), 
https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/sites/default/files/resources/suicide-ethnic-
populations.pdf.  
222.  Robert W. Robin et. al., Prevalence and Characteristics of Trauma and 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in a Southwestern American Indian Community, 154 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1582, 1582 (1997).   
223.  Aaron R. Denham, Rethinking Historical Trauma: Narratives of 
Resilience, 45 TRANSCULTURAL PSYCHIATRY 391, 396 (2008). 
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prolonged suffering for a lifetime, thus complicating an individual’s 
“way of life” and the generational affects.224  
Indian communities are the most impacted communities within the 
United States and the majority of the impactful thrusts culminated from 
external forces. Today, internal forces are impacting the state of health 
on Indian communities. After the tribal governments’ disenrollment 
actions, where and how do these disenfranchised people gain assistance 
to combat the depressive illness that may follow? If the “healing 
journey” can be found within the individual’s culture and identity, 
where does one turn when that culture has been terminated?225  
The full weight and measure of citizenship for American Indians 
remains in a quasi-state. After years of struggle to reach equal standing 
in the American political sovereign fabric, the American Indian remains 
abridged; equality of due process has yet to be reached. The federal 
government’s unwillingness to intervene remains steadfast. Santa 
Clara served to acknowledge tribal supremacy regarding enrollment, 
but the federation’s governments, which includes tribes, shield 
themselves with the same ruling regarding disenrollment. These two 
acts—to admit and to erase—have two distinctly different origins. Plus, 
falsifying information during the enrollment process, knowingly so or 
not, can only have merit when completing the process when the rules 
have changed, not after. These federation governments serve to silence 
the individual’s inalienable rights with destructive alienable laws. Santa 
Clara’s shield should not be extended to tribal laws that seek to erase 
the individual without due process.  
Such acts have a negative impact on already fragile communities. 
Indian Country already hosts deplorable health issues. These acts of 
disenrollment only enhance these traumatic conditions, leaving those 
disenrolled unprotected and no longer protected by federal or tribal 
human service programs.  Though further research is need to fully 
understand the state of those disenrolled, many studies already expose 
Indian Country’s traumas. The manmade actions can only serve to 
further the community trauma.  
                                                          
224.  Id.  
225.  See generally Hilary N. Weaver, Examining Two Facets of American 
Indian Identity: Exposure to Other Cultures and the Influence of Historical Trauma, 
2 J. HUM. BEHAV. SOC. ENV’T 19 (1999). 
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The federal government’s disinclination to intervene will most 
likely continue and the courts will most likely continue the Santa Clara 
path. Given that American Indians are the smallest population, the 
democratic system affords those elected to not be concerned with such 
minimal measures.  Congress has the power to adjust the balance in the 
direction of fairness. Until then, it is unclear what redress will be 
available to these communities.  
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